I greatly enjoyed Bing West’s book, The Strongest Tribe. In it, he went through the course of the Iraq war. He attributes, by my interpretation, our success as a result of the Sunni change of heart coupled with the change to COIN plus the common grunt. It was the day to day common decency and honesty of our troops that impressed the populace. They came to view us as honest brokers.
West now has a piece at National Review asking that we grant whatever wishes our generals make. It is an interesting piece worth a read. My first question, which he never addresses, is why we should trust the generals this time. The generals were wrong in Iraq for many years and wrong in Afghanistan. Does he make his case for granting the requests of the four stars this time also. Key quotes…
But five months has not erased years of distrust and turbulence. After the district governor met with the elders in a key village, the Taliban called their own meeting, which was attended by several of the same elders. The population, though thankful for the security, was hedging its bets. They know the Marines will not stay forever. Billions of dollars already have been spent in development projects to make Americans feel good about our generosity, but nation-building is an endless task. The tribes expect everything but give nothing in return.
It is not obvious that winning the hearts and minds of village elders, or linking villages to Kabul, wins the war. Our soldiers note that the Afghans are happy to accept what we give them but do not reciprocate by turning against the Taliban. The elders don’t raise militias or secure recruits for the army, and they don’t fight; there has been no replay of that scene from The Magnificent Seven in which the terrorized villagers finally rise up against their oppressors. Instead, fearful locals plead with migratory Taliban gangs to move on. A rural population, no matter how content with its government, cannot stand up to such a tough enemy.
This enemy fights with the elusive cunning of Apaches. Unencumbered by armor and hardy of foot, the assorted insurgent groups loosely known as “taliban with a small ‘t’” engage in maneuver warfare. Weighed down by their heavy gear, our troops respond with firepower. Local police turn a blind eye to the ubiquitous watchers — called “dickers” — who warn the Taliban about most of our patrols. Tribal relationships ensure that there are few arrests. By shooting from concealment at a distance, the enemy can proclaim his tribal or jihadist determination but stay alive. We are in a war of attrition, not one of decisive confrontations — a war that pits the will of NATO against the endurance of enemies who can retreat to sanctuary in Pakistan, behind a porous 2,400-kilometer border.
Because of that unsecured border, a strong Afghan security force will remain essential even after most of the country’s districts have been pacified. We are creating Afghan security forces in our image: They wear heavy armor and rely on our medevacs and artillery. To support them, we’re probably going to have to spend $20 billion to $40 billion annually for years to come, on top of the cost of U.S. combat units.
West makes a very compelling case that our troops are up against a difficult task. The Afghans have little reason to trust us after 8 years. The Taliban, who live there by the way, can cross into Pakistan anytime. They can spend years waiting us out. The costs will be immense. $100 billion a year, at least, for our troops and $40 billion a year for the Afghans, for 10, 20, 30 years.
Worst of all, West ignores Karzai’s corrupt government. West claims that Karzai is merely inept because there is not adequate security. We need to support him more fully he suggests. This ignores the sense from many who have been there that Karzai’s government is part of the problem. It is corrupt and inept. Lest we forget, he stole the election.
West likes football analogies. He thinks that if the owner stops interfering with the coaches, our generals, they will win for us. The way I see it, we have new coaches, with a new unproven game plan. We have a quarterback, Karzai, who is playing for the other side half the time, and mentally absent the rest. We can give him the best receivers and line in the game, he isn’t going to complete any passes. Is it possible to go wildcat and win without a quarterback? Not easy to win when the other side has all of its options and they what play is coming every time.
